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Abstract. LEX is a stream cipher based on the round transformation
of the AES block cipher, and it was selected for the final phase evalua-
tion of the eSTREAM project. LEX is 2.5 times faster than AES both
in software and in hardware. In this paper, we present a differential fault
attack on LEX. The fault model assumes that the attacker is able to flip
a random bit of the internal state of the cipher but cannot control the
exact location of the induced fault. Our attack requires 40 faults, and
recovers the secret key with 216 operations.
Keywords: LEX, stream cipher, AES, cryptanalysis, differential fault
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1 Introduction
The aim of the eSTREAM project was to stimulate work in the area of stream
ciphers. The call for primitives was released in 2004 and 34 proposals were sub-
mitted to the project. The competition was completed in 2008 and seven ciphers
were selected in the eSTREAM portfolio.
LEX [4] was one of the candidates of the eSTREAM final phase evaluation.
LEX is based on a design principle known as a leak extraction from a block
cipher. In this construction, the output key stream is extracted from parts of
the internal state of a block cipher at certain rounds (possibly after passing an
additional filter function). The extracted parts of the internal state need to be
selected carefully because leaking the wrong part of the state may endanger the
security of the cipher. The underlying block cipher of LEX is AES [7], and the
key stream is generated by extracting 32 bits from each round of AES in the
Output Feedback (OFB) mode. LEX has a simple and elegant structure and is
fast in software and hardware (2.5 times faster than AES).
There are two types of attacks against the security of cryptosystems: direct
attacks and indirect attacks. In direct attacks, the cryptanalyst targets to exploit
any theoretical weakness in the algorithm used in the cipher, and examples of
direct attacks include differential cryptanalysis [1] and linear cryptanalysis [13].
In indirect attacks, the attacker tries to obtain information from the physical im-
plementation of a cryptosystem, and aims to break the system by making use of
the gained information. Instances of indirect attacks include timing attacks [11],
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power attacks [12] and fault attacks [6]. The concept of fault analysis was first
introduced by Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [6] in 1996, and the attack was used to
target certain implementations of RSA and Rabin signatures by taking advan-
tage of hardware faults. Fault analysis was also used to attack block ciphers such
as DES [2]. It was showed in [10] that a fault attack is a powerful cryptanalytic
tool which can be employed to attack stream ciphers.
After LEX was submitted to the eSTREAM project, a few attacks against
this cipher have been proposed. The resynchronization of LEX is vulnerable to
a slide attack [15], and the attack needs 260.8 random IVs and 20,000 keystream
bytes generated from each IV. A generic attack, which requires 265.7 resynchro-
nizations, was published in [9]. A differential attack [8] can recover the secret key
of LEX in time of 2112 operations by using 236.3 bytes of key stream produced
by the same key (possibly under many different IVs). A related key attack was
shown in [14], and the attack requires 254.3 keystream bytes and can recover the
secret key with 2102 operations. These four proposed attacks on LEX belong to
direct attacks.
In this paper, we describe a differential fault attack on LEX. The fault model
assumes that the attacker can flip a random bit of the internal state of the cipher
and she can carry out the operation many times for the same internal state.
However, the attacker is not supposed to know the exact location of the flipped
bit. The proposed attack requires 40 faults and recovers the secret key of LEX
with 216 operations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the AES block cipher
and the LEX stream cipher. Section 3 provides the details of the differential fault
analysis of LEX. The paper is concluded in Section 4.
2 Descriptions of AES and LEX
We briefly describe the AES block cipher in Section 2.1. The LEX stream cipher
is described in Section 2.2. We provide the notations used throughout this paper
in Section 2.3.
2.1 The AES Block Cipher
The Advanced Encryption Standard [7] is a block cipher with a 128-bit block
length and supports key lengths of 128, 192 or 256 bits. For encryption, the input
is a plaintext and a secret key, and the output is a ciphertext. The plaintext is
first copied to a four-by-four array of bytes, which is called the state. After an
initial round key addition, the state array is transformed by performing a round
function 10, 12, or 14 times (for 128-bit, 192-bit or 256-bit keys respectively), and
the final state is the ciphertext. Each round of AES consists of the following four
transformations (the final round does not include the MixColumns operation).
– SubBytes (SB). It is a non-linear byte substitution that operates indepen-
dently on each byte of the state using a substitution table.
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– ShiftRows (SR). The bytes of the state are cyclically shifted over different
numbers of bytes. Row i is shifted to the left i byte cyclicly, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3.
– MixColumns (MC). It operates on the state column-by-column. The columns
are treated as polynomials and multiplied by a constant 4 × 4 matrix over
GF (28).
– AddRoundKey (ARK). A round key is added to the state by a simple bitwise
exclusive or (XOR) operation.
The AES round keys are derived from the cipher key by employing the key
schedule. The cipher key is first expanded into an expanded key. The round keys
are selected from this expanded key in the following way: the first round key
consists of the first Nb (the number of columns comprising the state) words, the
second one of the following Nb words, and so on. The expanded key is an array
of 4-byte words and is denoted by W [Nb ∗ (Nr+1)], where Nr is the number of
rounds. The first Nk (number of 32-bit words comprising the cipher key) words
contain the cipher key. All other words are defined recursively in terms of words
with smaller indices. The pseudocode for key expansion for 128-bit cipher keys
is shown below, where Key is the cipher key, SW (x) applies the substitution
operation to each byte of the word, RW (x) cyclically shifts the word to the left
8 bits, and Rcon is an array of predefined constants.
for(i = 0; i < Nk; i++)
W[i] = (Key[4*i],Key[4*i+1],Key[4*i+2],Key[4*i+3]);
for(i = Nk; i < Nb * (Nr + 1); i++)
temp = W[i-1];
if (i % Nk == 0)
temp = SW(RW(temp)) ^ Rcon[i/Nk];
W[i] = W[i-Nk] ^ temp;
2.2 The LEX Stream Cipher
Two versions of LEX, the original version [3] and the tweaked version [5], were
submitted to the eSTREAM project. We only provide the description of the
tweaked version in this paper. LEX uses the building blocks of the AES block
cipher. First, a standard AES key schedule for a secret 128-bit key K is per-
formed. Then, a given 128-bit IV is encrypted by a single AES encryption,
S = AESK(IV ). The 128-bit result S and the secret key K comprise a 256-bit
secret state of the stream cipher. Under the key K, S is repeatedly encrypted
in the OFB mode. In each round of the encryption, 32 bits are extracted from
the intermediate state to form the key stream. The positions of the extracted 32
bits are shown in Fig. 1. The IV is replaced after 500 encryptions and the secret
key is changed after 232 different IVs are used.
2.3 Notations
An AES intermediate state, as well as an AES round key, is represented as a
four-by-four array of bytes. A byte of an intermediate state is written as bi,j ,



















































Fig. 1. The positions of the leak in the even and odd rounds
the corresponding faulty byte is denoted by b′i,j , and the difference of bi,j and
b′i,j is represented as ∆bi,j , 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 3. A key byte of Round x is denoted by
Kxi,j , 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 3. The symbol ? stands for an unknown byte. In all figures, a
keystream byte of LEX is surrounded by a circle.
3 The Differential Fault Analysis
The fault model used in this paper assumes that the attacker can flip a random
bit of the internal state of the cipher during the keystream generation and obtain
the corresponding faulty key stream. Another assumption is that the attacker can
reset the state back to its original status and repeat the fault injection process
many times. However, the attacker is not supposed to know the exact location
of the injected fault. Based on the fault model, we first describe a method to
determine the fault position and then we show that the attacker can recover the
secret key of LEX by analyzing the original and faulty key stream.
3.1 The Fault Position Determination Method
Since the attacker does not know the exact fault position in our fault model,
we need to determine the fault location first. The idea is that we can find out
the fault position by observing the changes of the key stream after the fault is
injected. We show that we can identify into which byte the random bit fault is
injected. We divide all possible cases into two categories. In the first category,
the fault is injected into the state after the MC or ARK transformation, and
in the second category, the fault is injected into the state after the SB or SR
transformation.
We use Fig. 2 to describe the position determination method. Suppose the
three-round diagram starts with an odd round, i.e., i is an odd number (we
can also do the analysis by using the same idea if i is an even number). The
keystream bytes are g0,0, g0,2, g2,0 and g2,2 in Round i, l0,1, l0,3, l2,1 and l2,3 in
Round i+ 1 and s0,0, s0,2, s2,0 and s2,2 in Round i+ 2.
1. Category 1. The fault is injected into the state after the MC or ARK trans-
formation. We only focus on cases where the fault is injected into the state
after the MC transformation, and we can use the same idea to analyze cases
















































































































































































































Fig. 2. The three-round diagram
where the fault is injected into the state after the ARK operation. Suppose
the fault is induced to the state after the MC transformation in Round i. We
further divide all possible cases of this category into four groups and each
group contains four bytes.
– Group 1. This group includes four bytes: f0,0, f2,0, f0,2 and f2,2.
– Group 2. This group has four bytes: f1,0, f2,1, f3,2 and f0,3.
– Group 3. This group comprises four bytes: f3,0, f0,1, f1,2 and f2,3.
– Group 4. This group consists of four bytes: f1,1, f3,1, f1,3 and f3,3.
The relation between the fault position and the changes of the keystream
bytes is summarized in Table 1. For example, if a fault is induced to f0,0 (see
the first entry of Group 1 in Table 1) in Fig. 2, we can see the change of g0,0
from the key stream in Round i. Since g0,0 is changed, h0,0, y0,0, j0,0, j1,0,
j2,0, j3,0, l0,0, l1,0, l2,0, l3,0 are changed in Round i+ 1. However, we cannot
see the changes from the key stream in Round i+ 1 because the keystream
bytes of this round are l0,1, l0,3, l2,1 and l2,3. In Round i+2, all 16 bytes are
changed after the MC transformation and we can see that all four keystream
bytes s0,0, s0,2, s2,0 and s2,2 are changed. The difference among Group 1,
Group 2, Group 3 and Group 4 is that the changes of the keystream bytes
in Round i and Round i+ 1 take place at different positions.
2. Category 2. The fault is injected into the state after the SB or SR trans-
formation. We only concentrate on cases where the fault is injected into the
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Table 1. Four groups of fault positions
Group 1
Fault i i + 1 i + 2
f0,0 g0,0 None s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f2,0 g2,0 None s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f0,2 g0,2 None s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f2,2 g2,2 None s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
Group 2
Fault i i + 1 i + 2
f1,0 None l0,3, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f2,1 None l0,3, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f3,2 None l0,3, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f0,3 None l0,3, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
Group 3
Fault i i + 1 i + 2
f3,0 None l0,1, l2,1 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f0,1 None l0,1, l2,1 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f1,2 None l0,1, l2,1 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f2,3 None l0,1, l2,1 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
Group 4
Fault i i + 1 i + 2
f1,1 None None s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f3,1 None None s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f1,3 None None s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
f3,3 None None s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
state after the SR transformation, and we can use the same idea to analyze
cases where the fault is injected into the state after the SB transformation.
Assume that the fault is induced to the state after the SR transformation in
Round i. We split all possible cases of this category into three groups.
Table 2. Three groups of fault positions
Group 5
Fault i i + 1 i + 2
e0,0 g0,0, g2,0 l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e1,0 g0,0, g2,0 l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e2,0 g0,0, g2,0 l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e3,0 g0,0, g2,0 l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
Group 6
Fault i i + 1 i + 2
e0,2 g0,2, g2,2 l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e1,2 g0,2, g2,2 l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e2,2 g0,2, g2,2 l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e3,2 g0,2, g2,2 l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
Group 7
Fault i i + 1 i + 2
e0,1 None l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e1,1 None l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e2,1 None l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e3,1 None l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e0,3 None l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e1,3 None l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e2,3 None l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
e3,3 None l0,1, l0,3, l2,1, l2,3 s0,0, s0,2, s2,0, s2,2
– Group 5. This group has four bytes: e0,0, e1,0, e2,0 and e3,0.
– Group 6. This group is made up of four bytes: e0,2, e1,2, e2,2 and e3,2.
– Group 7. This group contains eight bytes: e0,1, e1,1, e2,1, e3,1, e0,3, e1,3,
e2,3 and e3,3.
The relation between the fault position and the changes of the keystream
bytes is described in Table 2. For instance, if a fault is injected into byte
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e0,0 (see the first entry of Group 5 in Table 2) in Fig. 2, g0,0, g1,0, g2,0 and
g3,0 are changed and we can observe the changes of g0,0 and g2,0 from the
key stream in Round i. In Round i + 1, all 16 bytes are changed after the
MC transformation and we can see the changes of l0,1, l0,3, l2,1 and l2,3 from
the key stream. Similarly, all 16 bytes are changed starting from the SB
operation in Round i+ 2, and we can see the changes of s0,0, s0,2, s2,0 and
s2,2 from the key stream.
By watching the changes of the keystream bytes listed in Table 1 and Table 2,
we can identify the fault position. In this paper we are only interested in cases
where a fault is injected into a byte which is listed in Table 1.
3.2 Recovering 4 Key Bytes of Round i + 2
We first show that we are able to recover the actual values of 12 bytes after the
SR transformation in Round i+ 2 by using 8 faults. Then, we describe the idea
of recovering 4 key bytes of Round i+ 2 by using the 12 known values.
We provide an observation which is used to identify the position of a faulty
byte in the MC transformation.
Observation 1 In the MixColumns transformation, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, if we
know three out of four input differences (∆y0,i, ∆y1,i, ∆y2,i and ∆y3,i) are zero
and one input difference is non-zero and we also know two output differences
(∆j0,i and ∆j2,i), the two unknown output differences (∆j1,i and ∆j3,i) and the















Suppose a fault is injected into a byte which is f0,3, f1,0, f2,1 or f3,2 (Group 2
in Table 1). We use Fig. 3 to demonstrate the progress. We establish a formula,
Formula (1), by using the input and out differences of the MC operation in
Round i + 1. We create another formula, Formula (2), with the input and out
differences of the MC transformation in Round i+ 2.
0 0 0 ∆y0,3
0 0 0 ∆y1,3
0 0 0 ∆y2,3




0 0 0 ∆j0,3
0 0 0 ∆j1,3
0 0 0 ∆j2,3




0 0 0 ∆q0,3
0 0 ∆q1,2 0
0 ∆q2,1 0 0




∆r0,0 ∆r0,1 ∆r0,2 ∆r0,3
∆r1,0 ∆r1,1 ∆r1,2 ∆r1,3
∆r2,0 ∆r2,1 ∆r2,2 ∆r2,3
∆r3,0 ∆r3,1 ∆r3,2 ∆r3,3

(2)
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1. We use Formula (1) to decide the values of ∆l1,3 and ∆l3,3 by performing
the following steps. Since ∆j0,3 is equal to ∆l0,3 and ∆j2,3 is equal to ∆l2,3
(∆l0,3 and ∆l2,3 can be calculated from the key stream), we know the values
of ∆j0,3 and ∆j2,3. In the fourth columns of the input and output, there are
5 known bytes (3 zero bytes, ∆j0,3 and ∆j2,3) and 3 unknown bytes (the
non-zero input byte, ∆j1,3 and ∆j3,3). Although we know there are three
zero inputs and one non-zero input, we do not know the exact layout of
the four input bytes. We can determine the 2 unknown output bytes (∆j1,3
and ∆j3,3) and the position and the difference of the non-zero input byte
by using Observation 1 (a similar method is described in [8], in which the
authors used 4 known bytes to calculate the values of 4 unknown bytes). In
Fig 3, we assume the faulty byte is f1,0. As ∆l1,3 is equal to ∆j1,3 and ∆l3,3
is equal to ∆j3,3, we know the values of ∆l1,3 and ∆l3,3.
2. In Formula (2), ∆q3,0 and ∆q1,2 can be deduced as follows.
(a) Because ∆r0,0 is equal to ∆s0,0 and ∆r2,0 is equal to ∆s2,0 (∆s0,0 and
∆s2,0 can be computed from the key stream), we know the values of∆r0,0
and∆r2,0. In the first columns of the input and output, there are 5 known
bytes (3 zero bytes, ∆r0,0 and ∆r2,0) and 3 unknown bytes (∆q3,0, ∆r1,0
and ∆r3,0). Here we know the positions of the three zero inputs and the
non-zero input (see the first column of the input in Formula (2)). The 3
unknown bytes can be deduced from the 5 known bytes.
(b) Similarly, there are 5 known bytes (3 zero bytes, ∆r0,2 and ∆r2,2) and
3 unknown bytes (∆q1,2, ∆r1,2 and ∆r3,2) in the third columns of the
input and output. The values of 3 unknown bytes can be computed by
making use of the 5 known bytes.
In Fig. 4, we know the values of ∆o1,3 and ∆o3,3 since we know ∆q1,2 and
∆q3,0 and the SR operation is just a permutation. Now we know the input
differences (∆l1,3, ∆l3,3) and the corresponding output differences (∆o1,3, ∆o3,3)
to the SB operation, and we can deduce 4 actual values for o1,3, o
′
1,3, o3,3 and
o′3,3 by using a lookup table, which contains all possible input differences and
their corresponding output differences of the SB operation. Here we encounter
a 1-in-2 situation: although we already have 4 actual values for o1,3, o
′
1,3, o3,3
and o′3,3, we cannot distinguish the correct values (o1,3 and o3,3) from the faulty
ones (o′1,3 and o
′
3,3). To address this problem, we need one more fault injected
into f1,0 and repeat the above steps since the correct values will appear twice in
both keystream processing. After we get the actual values of o1,3, o
′
1,3, o3,3 and
o′3,3, we know the actual values of q1,2, q
′
1,2, q3,0 and q
′
3,0 after the SR operation.
As we know the actual values of l0,1, l0,3, l2,1 and l2,3 from the key stream, we
know the actual values of q0,1, q0,3, q2,1 and q2,3 after the SB and SR operations.
So far, we know the actual values of 6 bytes, q1,2, q3,0, q0,1, q0,3, q2,1 and q2,3,
after the SR transformation in Round i+ 2:
? q0,1 ? q0,3
? ? q1,2 ?
? q2,1 ? q2,3
q3,0 ? ? ?
 .

























































































































































































































Round i+ 1 Round i+ 2 Round i+ 2
∆q3,0
∆q1,2
Fig. 4. Deducing the actual values of q1,2 and q3,0
We use the same idea to recover the actual values of q0,0, q2,2, q1,0, q3,2, q2,0
and q0,2. The details are listed as follows.
1. We are able to obtain the actual values of q0,0 and q2,2 by using 2 faults
which are injected into f0,0, or f2,2. The procedure is shown in Appendix A.
2. We can recover the actual values of q1,0 and q3,2 by using 2 faults which are
induced on f0,1, f1,2, f2,3 or f3,0. The steps are described in Appendix B.
3. We can get the actual values of q2,0 and q0,2 by using 2 faults which are
injected into f0,2 or f2,0. The details are presented in Appendix C.































































Fig. 5. Recovering 4 key bytes
Since we now know the actual values of the 12 bytes after the SR transfor-
mation in Round i + 2 in Fig. 5, we can compute the actual values of the first
column (r0,0, r1,0, r2,0 and r3,0) and third column (r0,2, r1,2, r2,2 and r3,2) of
the MC transformation. By XORing (r0,0, r0,2, r2,0, r2,2) with (s0,0, s0,2, s2,0,









3.3 Retrieving 16 Key Bytes in Round i − 1, i, i + 1 and i + 3






























2,3 ) more key bytes in Round i− 1, i, i+ 1 and i+ 3
(see Fig. 7) with 32 faults. The details of recovering these 16 key bytes are
provided as follows. We use Fig. 6 to describe the complete details.







1. Inject 2 faults into θ0,1 or θ2,3, and use these 2 faulty bytes to determine the
actual values of z0,1 and z2,3.
2. Induce 2 faults on θ0,2 or θ2,1, and employ these 2 faulty values to calculate
the actual values of z0,3 and z2,1.
3. Inject 2 faults into θ0,0, θ1,1, θ2,2 or θ3,3, and use these 2 faulty bytes to
decide the actual values of z1,3 and z3,1.
4. Induce 2 faults on θ0,2, θ1,3, θ2,0 or θ3,1, and employ these 2 faulty values to
find out the actual values of z1,1 and z3,3.
5. Apply the MC operation to (z0,1, z1,1, z2,1, z3,1) and (z0,3, z1,3, z2,3, z3,3) to
get the actual values of β0,1, β1,1, β2,1, β3,1, β0,3, β1,3, β2,3 and β3,3. XOR






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 7. The recovered key bytes
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1. Induce 2 faults on ϕ0,0 or ϕ2,2, and employ these 2 faulty values to compute
the actual values of e0,0 and e2,2.
2. Inject 2 faults into ϕ0,2 or ϕ2,0, and use these 2 faulty values to calculate the
actual values of e0,2 and e2,0.
3. Induce 2 faults on ϕ0,3, ϕ1,0, ϕ2,1 or ϕ3,2, and use these 2 faulty values to
decide the actual values of e1,2 and e3,0.
4. Inject 2 faults into ϕ0,1, ϕ1,2, ϕ2,3 or ϕ3,0, and employ these 2 faulty bytes
to determine the actual values of e1,0 and e3,2.
5. Apply the MC operation to (e0,0, e1,0, e2,0, e3,0) and (e0,2, e1,2, e2,2, e3,2)
to get the actual values of f0,0, f1,0, f2,0, f3,0, f0,2, f1,2, f2,2 and f3,2. XOR
f0,0 with g0,0, f0,2 with g0,2, f2,0 with g2,0, and f2,2 with g2,2 to retrieve the














1. Inject 2 faults into β0,1 or β2,3, and use these 2 faulty bytes to decide the
actual values of y0,1 and y2,3.
2. Induce 2 faults on β0,3 or β2,1, and employ these 2 faulty bytes to compute
the actual values of y0,3 and y2,1.
3. Inject 2 faults into β0,0, β1,1, β2,2 or β3,3 and use these 2 faulty bytes to
determine the actual values of y1,3 and y3,1.
4. Induce 2 faults on β0,2, β1,3, β2,0 or β3,1, and employ these 2 faulty bytes to
calculate the actual values of y1,1 and y3,3.
5. Apply the MC transformation to (y0,1, y1,1, y2,1, y3,1) and (y0,3, y1,3, y2,3,
y3,3) to obtain the actual values of j0,1, j1,1, j2,1, j3,1, j0,3, j1,3, j2,3 and j3,3.















1. Use 2 faulty bytes which are j0,1 or j2,3 to determine the actual values of
u0,1 and u2,3.
2. Employ 2 faulty bytes which are j0,3 or j2,1 to retrieve the actual values of
u0,3 and u2,1.
3. Make use of 2 faulty bytes which are j0,0, j1,1, j2,2 or j3,3 to calculate the
actual values of u1,3 and u3,1.
4. Employ 2 faulty bytes which are j0,2, j1,3, j2,0 or j3,1 to compute the actual
values of u1,1 and u3,3.
5. Apply the MC operation to (u0,1, u1,1, u2,1, u3,1) and (u0,3, u1,3, u2,3, u3,3) to
get the actual values of v0,1, v1,1, v2,1, v3,1, v0,3, v1,3, v2,3 and v3,3. We can






2,3 (see Fig. 7) by XORing v0,1 with γ0,1,
v0,3 with γ0,3, v2,1 with γ2,1, and v2,3 with γ2,3.










































































































Fig. 8. The deduced key bytes
3.4 Deducing 10 more Key Bytes in Round i + 2
By employing the definition and the properties of the AES key schedule, we use
the 20 recovered key bytes to deduce 10 more key bytes in Round i+2 (see Fig. 8).
The steps of deducing these 10 key bytes are listed as follows, where SB−1 is the
inverse of the byte substitution transformation and Rconi represents the round
constant used to generate round key Ki.


































































14 Jianyong Huang, Willy Susilo and Jennifer Seberry











2,0 ⊕Ki2,1 = SB(Ki3,3)⊕Rconi+1(2)⊕Ki2,0 ⊕Ki2,1



































































In summary, we recover 14 key bytes of Round i+2, and the 2 unknown key
bytes (Ki+21,0 and K
i+2
3,0 , represented by a question mark) can be determined by
exhaustive search with 216 operations.
4 Conclusions
We described a differential fault attack on LEX in this paper. We presented a
method to decide the fault position by observing the changes of the key stream
after a fault is injected. The attack makes use of the differential properties of the
AES round transformations, the AES key schedule properties and the structural
features of LEX. The proposed attack needs 40 faults and recovers the secret
key of LEX with 216 time complexity.
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A Calculating the actual values of q0,0 and q2,2
Assume a fault is induced on f0,0 or f2,2 (Group 1 in Table 1), and suppose the
faulty byte is f0,0. We create a formula, Formula (3), by employing the input and
out differences of the MC operation in Round i+ 1. We build another formula,
Formula (4), with the input and out differences of the MC transformation in
Round i+ 2. 
∆y0,0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0




∆j0,0 0 0 0
∆j1,0 0 0 0
∆j2,0 0 0 0
∆j3,0 0 0 0

(3)
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
∆q0,0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ∆q1,3
0 0 ∆q2,2 0




∆r0,0 ∆r0,1 ∆r0,2 ∆r0,3
∆r1,0 ∆r1,1 ∆r1,2 ∆r1,3
∆r2,0 ∆r2,1 ∆r2,2 ∆r2,3
∆r3,0 ∆r3,1 ∆r3,2 ∆r3,3

(4)
1. In Formula (3), ∆y0,0 can be computed from the key stream of Round i
by using the values of g0,0 and g
′
0,0. In the first columns of the input and
output, there are 4 known bytes (∆y0,0 and 3 zero bytes) and 4 unknown
bytes (∆j0,0, ∆j1,0, ∆j2,0 and ∆j3,0). The 4 unknown bytes can be decided
by using the 4 known bytes. After ∆j0,0, ∆j1,0, ∆j2,0 and ∆j3,0 are decided,
we know the values of ∆l0,0, ∆l1,0, ∆l2,0 and ∆l3,0.
2. In Formula (4), ∆r0,0 can be computed from the key stream of Round i+ 2
by using the values of s0,0 and s
′
0,0. Similarly, we get the value of ∆r2,0. In
the first columns of the input and output, there are 5 known bytes (∆r0,0,
∆r2,0 and 3 zero bytes) and 3 unknown bytes (∆q0,0, ∆r1,0 and ∆r3,0). We
get the values of∆q0,0,∆r1,0 and∆r3,0 by using the 5 known bytes. By using
the same method to analyze the third columns of the input and output, we
can deduce the values of ∆q2,2, ∆r1,2 and ∆r3,2 by employing the 5 known
bytes (∆r0,2, ∆r2,2 and 3 zero bytes).
3. We know ∆o0,0 and ∆o2,0 because ∆q0,0 is equal to ∆o0,0 and ∆q2,2 is
equal to ∆o2,0. Now we know the input differences (∆l0,0, ∆l2,0) and the
corresponding output differences (∆o0,0, ∆o2,0) to the SB operation, and we
can deduce 4 actual values for o0,0, o
′
0,0, o2,0 and o
′
2,0. Although we have
4 actual values for o0,0, o
′
0,0, o2,0 and o
′
2,0, we are not able to separate the





this problem, we need one more fault induced on f0,0 and repeat the steps
mentioned above to make the correct values emerge twice. After knowing
the actual values of o0,0, o
′
0,0, o2,0 and o
′
2,0, we obtain the actual values of
q0,0, q
′
0,0, q2,2 and q
′
2,2 after the SR operation.
B Computing the actual values of q1,0 and q3,2
Suppose a fault is induced on a byte which is f0,1, f1,2, f2,3 or f3,0 (Group 3 in
Table 1). By using the input and out differences of the MC operation in Round
i + 1, we establish a formula, Formula (5). By employing the input and out
differences of the MC transformation in Round i+ 2, we build another formula,
Formula (6). 
0 ∆y0,1 0 0
0 ∆y1,1 0 0
0 ∆y2,1 0 0




0 ∆j0,1 0 0
0 ∆j1,1 0 0
0 ∆j2,1 0 0




0 ∆q0,1 0 0
∆q1,0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ∆q2,3




∆r0,0 ∆r0,1 ∆r0,2 ∆r0,3
∆r1,0 ∆r1,1 ∆r1,2 ∆r1,3
∆r2,0 ∆r2,1 ∆r2,2 ∆r2,3
∆r3,0 ∆r3,1 ∆r3,2 ∆r3,3

(6)
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1. In Formula (5), ∆j0,1 can be computed from the key stream of Round i+ 1
by using the values of l0,1 and l
′
0,1, and ∆j2,1 can be computed from the
key stream of Round i+ 1 by using the values of l2,1 and l
′
2,1. In the second
columns of the input and output, we employ Observation 1 and use the 5
known bytes (∆j0,1, ∆j2,1 and 3 zero input bytes) to decide the 2 unknown
output bytes (∆j1,1 and ∆j3,1) and the position and the difference of the
non-zero input byte. Assume the recovered non-zero input byte is ∆y2,1.
2. In Formula (6), ∆r0,0 can be computed from the key stream of Round i+ 2
by using the values of s0,0 and s
′
0,0. Similarly, we get the value of ∆r2,0. In
the first columns of the input and output, we use the 5 known bytes (∆r0,0,
∆r2,0 and 3 zero bytes) to decide the 3 unknown bytes (∆q1,0, ∆r1,0 and
∆r3,0). By using the same method to analyze the third columns of the input
and output, we can deduce the values of 3 unknown bytes (∆q3,2, ∆r1,2 and
∆r3,2) by employing the 5 known bytes (∆r0,2, ∆r2,2 and 3 zero bytes).
3. We know ∆o1,1 and ∆o3,1 because ∆q1,0 is equal to ∆o1,1 and ∆q3,2 is
equal to ∆o3,1. We now know the input differences (∆l1,1, ∆l3,1) and the
corresponding output differences (∆o1,1, ∆o3,1) to the SB operation, and we
can deduce 4 actual values for o1,1, o
′
1,1, o3,1 and o
′
3,1. Although we have 4
actual values for o1,1, o
′
1,1, o3,1 and o
′
3,1, we cannot distinguish the correct




3,1). To address this
issue, we need one more fault injected into f2,3 and repeat the above steps
to make the correct values appear twice in both keystream processing. After
knowing the actual values of o1,1, o
′
1,1, o3,1 and o
′
3,1, we know the actual
values of q1,0, q
′
1,0, q3,2 and q
′
3,2 after the SR operation.
C Deducing the actual values of q2,0 and q0,2
Assume a fault is injected into a byte which is f0,2 or f2,0 (Group 1 in Table 1),
and assume the faulty byte is f2,0. We create a formula, Formula (7), with the
input and out differences of the MC operation in Round i + 1. We establish
another formula, Formula (8), by employing the input and out differences of the
MC transformation in Round i+ 2.
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 ∆y2,2 0




0 0 ∆j0,2 0
0 0 ∆j1,2 0
0 0 ∆j2,2 0




0 0 ∆q0,2 0
0 ∆q1,1 0 0
∆q2,0 0 0 0




∆r0,0 ∆r0,1 ∆r0,2 ∆r0,3
∆r1,0 ∆r1,1 ∆r1,2 ∆r1,3
∆r2,0 ∆r2,1 ∆r2,2 ∆r2,3
∆r3,0 ∆r3,1 ∆r3,2 ∆r3,3

(8)
1. In Formula (7), ∆y2,2 can be computed from the key stream of Round i
by using the values of g2,0 and g
′
2,0. In the third columns of the input and
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output, we use 4 known bytes (∆y2,2 and 3 zero bytes) to decide 4 unknown
bytes (∆j0,2, ∆j1,2, ∆j2,2 and ∆j3,2). The values of ∆l0,2, ∆l1,2, ∆l2,2 and
∆l3,2 are also decided.
2. In Formula (8), ∆r0,0 can be computed from the key stream of Round i+ 2
by using the values of s0,0 and s
′
0,0. Similarly, we get the value of ∆r2,0 by
using the values of ∆s2,0 and ∆s
′
2,0. In the first columns of the input and
output, we can use the 5 known bytes (∆r0,0, ∆r2,0 and 3 zero bytes) to
decide the 3 unknown bytes (∆q2,0, ∆r1,0 and ∆r3,0). Similarly, we can use
the 5 known bytes (∆r0,2, ∆r2,2 and 3 zero bytes) to decide the 3 unknown
bytes (∆q0,2, ∆r1,2 and ∆r3,2) in the third columns of the input and output.
3. We know ∆o0,2 and ∆o2,2 because ∆q0,2 is equal to ∆o0,2 and ∆q2,0 is
equal to ∆o2,2. We now know the input differences (∆l0,2, ∆l2,2) and the
corresponding output differences (∆o0,2, ∆o2,2) to the SB operation, and we
can deduce 4 actual values for o0,2, o
′
0,2, o2,2 and o
′
2,2. Although we have
4 actual values for o0,2, o
′
0,2, o2,2 and o
′
2,2, we cannot separate the correct




2,2). To overcome this
obstacle, we need one more fault injected into f2,0 and repeat the above steps
because the correct values will emerge twice in both keystream processing.
After knowing the actual values of o0,2, o
′
0,2, o2,2 and o
′
2,2, we know the actual
values of q0,2, q
′
0,2, q2,0 and q
′
2,0 after the SR operation.
